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An Ethical Evaluation of Federal Norms 
for Fetal Experimentation 
Kevin O'Rourke, O.P. 
Father O'Rourke is Director of 
the Medical-Moral Department of 
the Catholic Hospital Association 
in St. Louis. In this article, he 
raises some questions regarding 
the work which was done by the 
National Commission for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects of Bio-
medical and Behavioral Research. 
In July, 1974, Congress passed 
the National Research Act which 
imposed a temporary moratorium 
on research on human fetuses, 
either before or after induced 
abortion, if carried out or fi-
nanced by the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare 
(DHEW). The act also created 
the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search to study the legal, ethical, 
and medical aspects of scientific 
research upon human subjects. I 
The first task assigned by Con-
gress to the commission was ex-
tremely difficult. The commission 
was asked to explore fetal experi-
mentation, an extremely contro-
versial topic, and to submit 
recommendations concerning such 
experimentation to the secretary, 
DHEW. This study required that 
the demands and necessities of a 
pluralistic society, as well as the 
dignity of human subjects and the 
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needs of scientific progress, be 
considered. On May 21, 1975, the 
commission submitted its recom-
mendations to Secretary Caspar 
W. Weinberger. In August, Wein-
berger lifted the year-long ban on 
fetal research and issued federal 
regulations for fetal experimenta-
tion which, for the most part, are 
consistent with the commission's 
recommendations. The regula-
tions, along with the full report 
of the commission, were published 
in the Federal Register, August' 
8, 1975." 
Given the difficulty of the task, 
the brief time frame allowed for 
formulating norms, and the novel-
ty of the assignment, the commis-
sion should be commended for its 
sincere and open-minded effort. 
Moreover, it deserves praise fol' 
the method followed. i.e., first 
stating principles that It intended 
to follow and then applying these 
principles to the various types of 
fetuses that might be used for ex-
perimentation or research. How-
ever, the work of the commission 
has one serious drawback: the 
recommendations fail to apply the 
principles consistently and ac-
curately. As a consequence, the 
fed e l' a I regulations, consistent 
with the recommendations, call 
into question centuries of humane 
tradition whereby the human 
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rights of the weak and infirm 
have been protected. 
Because the matter of human 
research and experimentation is 
so important, not only for the 
future of medical research but for 
the future quality of human rela-
tionships in our society, it will be 
worthwhile to present the prin-
ciples for research upon human 
subjects formulated by the com-
mission and how some of the rec-
ommendations fail to meet the 
standards set by these principles. 
I. The Principles of 
Medical Research 
The commission lists the fol-
lowing four principles "among the 
general principles for research on 
human subjects judged to be valid 
and binding: 
1. To avoid harm whenever possi · 
ble, or at least to minimize harm; 
2. To provide for fair treatment by 
avoiding discrimination between 
classes or among members of the 
same class (referred to later as 
the principle of equality) ; 
3. To respect the integrity of hu· 
m a n subjects by requiring in· 
formed consent ; 
4. To respect the human character 
of the fetus." (VIII. B). 
Later, when discussing the mat-
ter of risk and consent, the com-
mission lists a fifth principle: 
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"The commission affirms as a gen· 
eral principle that manifest ri sks 
imposed on nonconsenting subjects 
cannot be tolerated. Therefore, the 
commission concludes that only 
minimal risk can be accepted as 
permissible for nonconsenting sub· 
jects in nontherapeutic research." 
(VIII, C, 3). 
In addition to these five prin-
ciples, the commission states that 
certain general requirements are 
necessary for ethical research 
upon fetuses. These would be as-
certained in the review process 
which must precede approval of 
any research project. These gEm-
eral requirements are: 
1. " Appropriate prior investigations 
using a nimal models and non· 
pregnant huma ns must have been 
completed. 
2. The knowledge to be ga ined 
must be important and obtain· 
a ble by no reasonable alternative 
means. 
3. Risks a nd benefits to both the 
mother and the fetus must have 
been fully evaluated and de· 
scribed. 
4. Informed consent must be sought 
a nd granted under proper con-
ditions. 
5. Subjects must be selected so that 
risks a nd benefi ts will not fall 
inequitably among economic, ra· 
cia l, ethnic, and social classes." 
(VIII, C, 3). 
Each of these principles and re-
quirements is valid, and each pro-
tects and/ or fosters the dignity 
of human subjects of research and 
experimentation. If they had been 
applied consistently in accord 
with the express intention of the 
commission to treat the fetus as 
"a human subject," then a hu-
mane and acceptable set of rec-
ommendations could have been 
formulated. But the principles 
were not applied consistently. 
One reason for the lack of con-
sistency and accuracy in applying 
these principles may have been 
insufficient time. The commission 
admitted that it was "placed un-
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der severe limitation of time by its 
Congressional mandate. As a re-
sult, these considerations on re-
search involving fetuses have nec-
essarily been developed prior to 
the commission's larger task of 
studying the nature of research, 
t.he basic ethical principles which 
should guide it, the problem of 
informed consent and the review 
process." (VIII). Hence, the com-
mission admitted that it "has not 
yet studied the issues surrounding 
informed consent for non thera-
peutic research." (VIII, C). Yet 
it proceeded to approve recom-
mendations, which in order to be 
just and humane, require a clear 
notion of the principle of informed 
consent as well as the import of 
its corrollary; manifest risks im-
posed upon nonconsenting sub-
jects cannot be tolerated. 
Clearly, the commission should 
have finished the consideration 
concerning consent before formu-
I a tin g recommendations. This 
would have been more important 
than meeting the Congressional 
deadline. Consent is, after all, the 
heart of the matter for human re-
search. The ramifications of con-
tradicting the p r inc i pie of 
informed consent for harmful ex-
perimentation are far-reaching. 
Our civilization is based upon re-
spect for individual dignity and 
equality; one of its highest ideals 
is to protect the weak and infirm 
from harm; it professes that the 
individual does not exist for the 
state and cannot be sacrificed un-
willingly for public welfare. All 
these values might be endangered 
if the principles of informed con-
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sent are not followed faithfully. 
By proceeding as it did, the com-
mission opted for an interpreta-
tion of this principle that is so 
broad it is meaningless. 
II. The Specific 
Recommendations 
In order to show the specific in-
stances where the conclusions of 
the commission are not in accord 
with the principles it avows, let us 
study the recommendations in 
greater detail. 
The first two recommendations 
concern therapeutic research, the 
first considering research upon 
the fetus and the second con-
cerned with research upon preg-
nant women. The first is ade-
quate, but the second gives cause 
for concern. The reason for con-
cern is that research directed pri-
marily toward the pregnant wom-
an in many cases will affect the 
fetus as well, and it is important 
that the rights of the fetus be 
protected. Recognizing that "the 
therapeutic research directed to-
ward the pregnant woman may 
expose the fetus to risk for the 
benefit of another subject," the 
commission makes some effort to 
protect the fetus by stating that 
the research upon pregnant wom-
en may be supported provided 
that such research will "put the 
fetus at minimum risk consistent 
with the provision of health care 
for the woman." (VIII, C, 2). But 
the actual protection afforded the 
fetus is extremely tenuous be-
cause the commission also rec-
ognizes "the woman's p rio r i t Y 
regarding her own health care." 
This latter phrase would allow 
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research that would injure or even 
destroy the fetus if it were "con-
sistent with the health needs of 
the mother." If the term "health 
of the mother" is interpreted as 
it was in the Supreme Court de-
cision regarding abortion (and 
there is no reason to think it will 
not be), then any research which 
treats a pregnant woman for emo-
tional or psychological difficulty, 
as well as for physiological mala-
dies, could justify research en-
dangering the fetus . In such cases, 
the fetus would not be treated as 
a "human subject in scientific re-
search" as the commission avowed 
it should. Rather, in spite of some 
palliative language, the fetus is 
treated as a thing, to be disposed 
of if the "health needs of the preg-
nant woman" warrant it. 
Acknowledging the Sup rem e 
Court's decisions which subordi-
nated the fetus' right to life and 
the right to due process of the 
woman's right to privacy (Roe vs. 
Wade, Doe vs. Bolton), the com-
mission might have felt unable to 
give greater recognition to the 
fetus' right to be considered a hu-
man subject. But if the Supreme 
Court's decision is to be used as 
the guiding standard for formu-
I a tin g f eta I experimentation 
norms, then the effort to formu-
late humane norms is worthless 
from the beginning. Why spend 
time debating when and how fetal 
experimentation can take place if 
the fetus has no right to be treat-
ed as a human subject, no right to 
life, and no right to human dig-
nity? Rig h tfu I consideration 
would be given to the fetus if the 
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clause "consistent with meeting 
the health needs of the pregnant 
woman" were eliminated, and the 
woman's health did not receive 
priority. In this way, the rights 
of the fetus and those of the wom-
an would be balanced One against 
the other and protected equally. 
Even though the Supreme Court 
has denied the human fetus equal 
protection under law under the 
guise of the right to privacy, the 
commission should not have made 
the same mistake under the guise 
of therapeutic research. 
Non-Therapeutic Research 
In recommendation 3, the com-
mission considers non therapeutic 
research directed toward the preg-
nant woman. Once again, the key 
question is: will the fetus be re-
spected as a human subject? The 
commission seems to recognize 
the right of the fetus to be pro-
tected for it concludes in recom-
mendatIOn 3 that nontherapeutic 
research directed toward a preg-
nant woman should be funded 
only if the research "a) has been 
evaluated for possible impact up-
on the well-being of the fetus; and 
b) will impose minimal or no risk 
to the well-being of the fetus." 
However, the commission also ad-
mits that ((the term minimal in.-
volves a value j u dg men t and 
acknowledges that medical opin.-
ion will differ regarding what con-
stitutes minimal risk ." (VIII, C. 
3). The main factor causing dif-
ferences of opinion about minimal 
risk is whether or not the fetus 
will be aborted. Minimal risk for 
a fetus going' to term is, differ-
ent, according to some commis-
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sion members, from one that will 
be aborted. The thought seems to 
be: if the fetus is going to be de-
stroyed, then less care need be 
devoted to it. 
The commission states that in 
any research procedure, the "de-
termination of acceptable mini-
mal risk is a function of the 
review process." But the door is 
clearly open for those who con-
duct the review process to use 
more lenient norms for minimal 
risk in the case of fetuses to be 
aborted than for those who will 
be carried to term. According to 
the report, "there"is a basic agree-
ment among commission members 
as to the validity of the equality 
principle. There is disagreement 
as to its application to individual 
fetuses and classes of fetuses ." 
(VIII, C, 3). It seems. however, 
that the absence of more definite 
protection from harmful experi-
mentation for the fetus to be 
aborted amounts to a disavowal 
and contradiction of the equality 
principle, not merely a disagree-
ment in regard to its application. 
Indeed, to allow human subjects 
to be used for medical research 
experimentation simply because 
they will soon die, especially if 
t he research might be harmful , 
endangers the humane tradition 
of western civilization. If the com-
mission wished to grant the fetus 
its rights as a human subject, it 
would have refused to consider 
the possibihty of any research 
which would allow the fetus to be 
treated differently simply because 
it would later be aborted. This 
would put "minima} risk" into 
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proper context. The commISSIOn 
considered this possibility and re-
jected it. (VIII, C, 3). 
The f 0 u r t h recommendation 
concerns non therapeutic research 
directed toward the fetus in utero 
when abortion is not anticipated. 
This recommendation affords am-
ple protection to the fetus, and 
were it applied to fetuses that will 
be aborted, the commission would 
have been acting in accord with 
its principles. Instead, the com-
mission treated fetuses in utero 
that would be aborted in a sepa- . 
rate section, recommendation 5. 
Recommendation 5 has two seri-
ous shortcomings: first of all, it 
allows for the same ambig1::lous 
interpretation of minimal risk in 
the case of fetuses to be aborted 
that was mentioned in regard to 
recommendation 3. Secondly, it 
contains an " escape clause" which 
states: 
"resea rch presenting special prob· 
le ms related to the interpretation or 
application of these guidelines may 
be conducted or supported by the 
DHEW secretary, provided that 
such resea rch has been approved by 
a ' nat.ional ethical review body,'" 
What "special problems" might 
be used to justify different treat-
ment - for ·fe tuses to be aborted, 
the -commission does not declare, 
but judging from some of the 
exp e r i ill e n ts that have been 
performed on aborted fetuses 
throughout the world, this clause 
could open a pandora's box. More-
over, it violates the principle of 
eq uality as weIl as the principle 
that only minimal risk can be ac-
cepted as permissible for subjects 
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in nontherapeutic research. As 
David Louisell, a committee mem-
ber who felt obliged to write a 
minority report, declared, "this 
clause should be omitted and in 
its place there should be a dec-
laration that no research should 
be permitted on a fetus to be 
aborted that would not be per-
mitted on one to go to term." The 
decision that a woman makes to 
have an abortion should not make 
it possible for a human fetus to be 
misused, no matter what national 
interest or medical knowledge 
might be involved. 
Dying Fetuses 
Recommendation 6, concerning 
nontherapeutic res ear c h upon 
fetuses that are dying, that is, 
research directed toward the fetus 
during the abortion process and 
the nonviable fetus ex utero. The 
commission seemingly makes an 
effort to protect these fetuses by 
requiring that "no significant pro-
cedural changes are introduced 
into the abortion procedure in the 
interest of research alone; and no 
intrusion into the fetus is made 
which alters the duration of life." 
But there is no requirement which 
would protect the dying fetus 
fro m harmful experimentation 
which did not shorten or lengthen 
its life. The mere fact that a fetus 
is dying, no matter from what 
cause, is not sufficient grounds 
for allowing experimentation upon 
it, especially harmful experimen-
tation, or for withdrawing the 
protection afforded other human 
subjects. Would we experiment 
with dying adults if we did not 
have their consent? Would we 
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carry out harmful experimenta-
tions upon dying children, even if 
their parents gave proxy consent? 
It seems that the commission is 
following the thought of the Su-
preme Court, and depriving the 
fetus to be aborted of all human 
consideration. If the commission 
wishes to treat the dying fetus as 
a "human subject in scientific re-
search," and if it wishes to apply 
consistently the p r inc i pIe of 
equality, then it must consider 
how other dying members of so-
or shortened by proposed research. 
and experimentation are under 
considera tion. 
The harmful "escape clause" 
appended to recommendation 5 is 
also contained in recommendation 
6. Given this opening, the DHEW 
secretary, Cas par Weinberger, 
made the federal regulation con-
cerning dying fetuses even more 
premissive than the recommenda-
tion of the commission. The com-
mission had stated that the dying 
fetus 's life could not be extended 
or shortened by proposed research. 
However, the Federal Regulations 
reverses this position, explaining: 
"the secretary is persuaded by the 
weight of scientific evidence that re -
search pe rformed on the nonvia ble 
fetus ex utero has contributed 
substantially to the ability of phy-
sician~ to bring to viability inc reas -
ingly small fetuses. The secretary 
perceives that it is in the public in-
terest to continue this successful 
research and accordingly an exemp-
tion is m ade to the recommendation 
of the commission to permit re-
search to develop new methods for 
enabling fetuses to survive to the 
point of viability. " 
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knowledge that more immature 
fetuses can survive is indeed a 
worthy goal, but the means ap-
proved by the Federal Regula-
tions are highly unethical. The 
Regulations would allow for harm-
ful experimentation upon dying 
fetuses, would allow its life to be 
shortened or lengthened, would 
allow fetuses to be harvested and 
maintained for the sole purpose 
of research. By means of this reg-
ulation the fetus can be treated as 
a thing, with no dignity or rights 
of its own. Even those who would 
not give full human rights to the 
fetus, must think long and hard 
about this regulation and its im-
plications for the future. It rep-
resents a breakdown, a denial, of 
the total medical, ethical and so-
cial standards of our society. If 
fetuses can be treated as things 
in the interest of "society or med-
ical progress," then so can anyone 
else. 
Possibly Viable Infants and 
Dead Fetuses 
The seventh recommendation 
concerns research directed toward 
the possibly viable infant. Here 
the requirements are sound and 
well stated, being based upon the 
conviction "that there is a moral 
legal obligation to attempt to save 
the life of a possibly viable in-
fant." (VIII, C, 4). Recommen-
dation 9 stipulates the conditions 
for research on dead fetuses and 
fetal tissue. Hence, the commis-
sion recommends that such "re-
search be permitted if consistent 
with local law, the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act and commonly 
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held convictions about respect 
for the dead." What these " com-
monly held convictions about 
respect for the dead" are, the 
commission does not state. Cer-
tainly, disputes will arise concern-
ing the practical implementation 
of this recommendation, but ac-
cepted protocol for research upon 
dead adults could serve as a guide 
for conducting the review process 
on research on dead fetuses. For 
example, some thought should be 
given to the matter of consent. 
Who will give the consent needed 
to release dead fetuses for re-
search? Would the mother of an 
aborted fetus have relinquished 
this right by reason of her deci-
sion to have the fetus destroyed? 
Would the court be empowered to 
grant this permission? Or would 
it be presumed that dead fetuses, 
unlike dead children or dead 
adults, are public property and 
can be disposed of indiscriminate-
ly? In many countries where abor-
tion is commonplace, scandalous 
practices, such as buying and sell-
ing dying and dead fetuses, have 
occurred. Firm steps should be 
taken to avoid the possibility of 
this happening in the United 
States. While the dead fetus can-
not be harmed by such practices, 
one of the principles of the com-
mission is that the human char-
acter of the fetus should be re-
spected. This demands some con-
trol over the way fetuses are pro-
vided for experimentation, even 
if they are no longer living. More-
over, concern for the dead and the 
way their remains are treated is 
also a measure of the humanity 
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of the living. 
The other recommendations, 8 
and 10 through 16, concern the 
review process, rights of con-
science which allow one to refuse 
to participate in a research activi-
ty if contrary to his moral con-
victions or religious beliefs, and 
certain requirements for the pro-
cedures of research . While all 
these recommendations have ethi-
cal implications, they are not di-
rectly connected with the princi-
ples enunciated by the commis-
sion. 
Conclusion 
Because the federal regulations 
for fetal experimentation, based 
upon the recommendations of the 
commission, have now been pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of 
DHEW, it would seem that the 
issue of their merit is closed. But 
this is not the case. In the firs t 
place, views and arguments re-
lating to the recommendat ions of 
the commission may be sent to 
the DHEW secretary, and on the 
basis of such considerations, the 
DHEW secretary "may proceed 
to further proposed rule making 
and possible amendments to the 
regulations as issued." 
In the second place, let us re-
alize that the matter of fetal ex-
perimentation was brought into 
the public forum because of pub-
lic concern. The concern of "ordi-
nary people" not only led to the 
actions taken by Congress in re-
gard to fetal experimentation, it 
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also caused 15 states to ban com-
pIe t e ly fetal experimentation. 
Hence, if these federal regulations 
do not seem to express a con-
sensus acceptable to the people, 
perhaps the matter will be in the 
hands of Congress once again. As 
one writer observed, "At a mini-
mum, American re s ear c her s 
should understand that they face 
a legislative ban on experimenta-
tion unless a compromise solution 
is adopted."4 Could these rec-
ommendations which form the 
substance of the federal regula-
tions be called a compromise? Do 
they express a general consensus 
for a pluralistic society if they 
violate the principles of equality 
and informed consent and allow 
human subjects to be treated as 
things in the interest of research? 
While appreciating all the bene-
ficial work that the commission 
produced, con c ern e d persons 
should offer to their elected rep-
resentatives a polite but firm ob-
jection to the Federal Regulat ions 
as they now stand. 
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